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Dickinson: Amending Our Negotiable Instruments Law

AMENDING OUR NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
E. C. DICKINSON*

The Revisers of the Code of West Virginia, in their report to the Legislature,' have recommended that twentyseven sections of the present chapter 98-A, dealing with
negotiable instruments, be amended. Four of these suggested changes would merely correct clerical errors which
appear in the present act and involve no substantial change
in the law. Of the remaining twenty-three, a part, apparently, are intended to clarify the law, but others, and perhaps most of them, admittedly change the present statutory rules applicable to bills, notes and checks.
The Negotiable Instruments Law was the first of the
uniform commercial acts recommended to the states for
adoption by the body now known as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Adopted
first by Connecticut in 1897, it required twenty-seven years
to convince all the states of the desirability of codifying
this branch of the law. It has been a part of the law of
West Virginia for twenty years. With a few changes here
and there, it has now been adopted in the District of Columbia, all the states and territories except Porto Rico, and in
the Philippines. Such departures from the original draft
as have been made are the result largely of the criticism
in 1900, of certain sections of the Negotiable Instruments
Law by Professor Ames, 2 theni Dean of the Harvard Law
School, which led to the Ames-Brewster controversy and to
a very thorough re-examination of its provisions by leading
jurists. As a result of this discussion certain of the modifications suggested by Dean Ames, and later formulated as
amendments by Professor Brannan, 3 have come to be generally regarded as desirable, and two or three states in
adopting the Act have made some of these changes. Then,
too, the several thousand cases decided under the Act have
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University.

Chapter 46 of the Revisers' Report contains the Negotiable Instrument Law as
revised.
J. B. Ames, "The Negotiable Instruments Law," 14 HARV. L. REV. 241.
J. D. Brannan, "Some Necessary Amendments of the Negotiable Instruments
Law," 26 HARv. L. REV. 493, 588. Many of these will be found also In BRANNAN'S
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw ANNOTATED, 4th ed., under pertinent sections.
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brought to light a number of ambiguities and uncertainties
resulting in continued conflict of authority. A few of the
states have endeavored to remove these sources of conflict
by modifying the offending provisions of the Act.
It must be admitted, therefore, that while the general
adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law has brought
about the desired uniformity upon many important questions, it is equally true that it has fallen far short of realizing the ideal of complete uniformity which its draftsmen
likely entertained. In the light of what has occurred in
other states, it is not surprising that the Revisers of our
Code have undertaken to remedy certain defects and omissions in our Negotiable Instruments Law which the experience of twenty years has disclosed. It is plain, however,
that with every such modification of the official draft, we
are getting further away from that uniformity which the
Act was intended to secure, and to that extent defeating the
purpose of its adoption. There is serious doubt in the
writer's mind whether the benefit to be derived from any
amendment suggested by the Code Commission is great
enough, or its need sufficiently urgent, to warrant securing
it at such a cost. Fortunately, a way is open by which the
most needed of these amendments may be secured and substantial uniformity retained.
In a recent article entitled "Keeping the Uniform State
Laws Uniform," 4 Judge Hargest, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, makes the following suggestion:
"The only proper way to amend uniform statutes is to call
the attention of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws to the need of amendment. That
Conference, as experience in the past has shown, then considers the question in the same way that it considers an
original Act. When satisfied, as the Conference sometimes is, that an amendment is desirable, it prepares such
an amendment with care and recommends it for adoption
to the several states. An observance of this rule would also
go a long way toward keeping the uniform statutes uniform." This thing has occurred, apparently, in the case of
the Negotiable Instruments Law. The Commissioners on
1 76

U. op PA. L. REV. 178.
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Uniform State Laws have not been unmindful of the criticisms aimed at the original draft, of the ambiguities which
have appeared and of the conflicting interpretations put
upon its provisions. At the 36th Annual meeting in Denver
in 1926 the Conference decided that the time had come for
entering upon the study of the need for a comprehensive
amendment of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The matter
was referred to a special committee upon the Amendment
of the Uniform Acts, with Professor Williston as Chairman.
At a meeting held last August this committee reported as
the basis for -further discussion a list of proposed amend,ments to twenty-four sections of the, Act. Criticism of this
report has been solicited by the committee and a careful
study of the changes suggested is being made by members
of the profession best fitted by training and experience to
make recommendations. Whether the committee will act
finally upon these amendments at its next meeting in July
is not known. The defects in the original act will serve,
no doubt, as a warning against undue haste. The advisability of further amendments to correct defects and omissions not covered by the committee's proposals has been
ably pointed out 5 and will doubtless receive careful consideration at the hands of the committee. It is not too much
to expect that, when finally submitted to the states for
adoption, the proposed amendments will represent the consensus of opinion of a large body of the country's leading
bankers and lawyers on what is advisable in the way of
modification.
If the desire for uniformity in the law of negotiable instruments is still prevalent, and the writer believes it is,
this Amendatory Act should be welcomed by all the states
as a means of approaching nearer the ideal of complete
uniformity than ever has been possible under the original
act, for most of the modifications, as will later appear, do
not purport to change the law but only to clarify it so as to
secure uniformity of interpretation. In this aim, it would
seem, our own state should cooperate. If this Act, when
finally submitted to the states, embodies the most important
of the changes desired by our Code Commission, it should
be seized upon gladly as a means of obtaining the needed
Arthur H. Kent, "Some Further Necessary
tiable Instruments Law," 22 ILL. L. KRE. 833.

Amendments to the Uniform Nego-

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1928

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [1928], Art. 3
AMENDING OUR NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW

329

amendments without destroying the uniformity which now
exists.
It has been suggested that a discussion in the pages of
the Law Quarterly of the amendments to our negotiable
instruments law proposed by the Code Commission might
direct attention to the subject and perhaps lead to a consideration of the proposed changes, by the bar of the state,
which otherwise they might not receive. Regardless of the
action which may be taken on other Chapters of the Code,
there may be good and sufficient reason for not altering,
especially at this time, a uniform statute such as the Negotiable Instruments Law. Intelligent action cannot be expected without a careful examination of the sections affected. This should include an investigation of the purpose
of each change suggested, the need for such change, and
the desirability of the modification proposed. Where the
purpose of the change is merely to clarify the law, then no
serious objection to its adoption would appear. Textual
uniformity, while desirable, is of less importance than uniformity of interpretation. On the other hand, amendments
which change the law should not be adopted unless it plainly appears that the present rule has worked hardship for
which not even the benefit of uniformity can compensate.
In considering the amendments, also, the possible inconsistencies which may result from their adoption must not be
lost sight of. The writer feels, too, that such a study should
be made in the light of the report of the Committee on
Amendment of Uniform Acts and will therefore make frequent reference to their proposals and discuss briefly their
recommendations at the end of this paper. The amendments
suggested by our Code Commission will first be taken up
in order.
In Articles 1 and 2, dealing respectively with "Form and
Interpretation" and "Consideration," the only change pro,posed is the omission of the words "of a specified person"
from subdivision (d) of Section 1 of Article 1, which reads:
"(d) Must be payable to the order of a specified person or
to bearer." The words omitted are superfluous and the
change wholly immaterial.
In Article 3, relating to negotiation, four changes are
proposed. Three of these, in Sections 30, 38 and 45, merely
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correct clerical errors and make the sections identical with
the uniform act. These corrections should be made at an
appropriate time. The fourth change is the omission of
Section 40, which reads as follows:
"Where an instrument payable to bearer is indorsed
specially, it may nevertheless be further negotiated by
delivery; but the person indorsing specially is liable as
indorser to only such holders as make title through his
indorsement."
The repugnancy of this section to Subsection 5 of Section 9
was pointed out by Dean Ames6 and its repeal advocated by
Professor Brannan. 7 Section 9-5 implies that unless the
"only or last indorsement is in blank" the instrument ceases
to be payable to bearer. Section 40 provides that an instrument payable to bearer may be negotiated by delivery even
when specially indorsed. Section 9-5 abrogated the rule of
Smith v. Clarke, 8 while Section 40 re-enacted it and was so
understood by the draftsman.9 The attempt to reconcile
the two sections by treating Section 40 as applying only to
instruments payable on their face to bearer has not been
entirely satisfactory, and the mercantile understanding has
always been that if an instrument payable to bearer is
indorsed specially, the indorsement of the special indorsee
should be necessary for negotiation whether originally payable to bearer, or payable to order and indorsed in blank.
The Committee on Amendment of Uniform Acts also recommends the repeal of Section 40, and to prevent such decisions as that of Parker v. Roberts,10 would add to Section 9
the following:
"When an instrument payable to bearer is specially or
restrictively indorsed it ceases to be payable to bearer
and becomes payable according to the terms of the indorsement."
The purpose of the Code Commission would be more surely
accomplished by following this course than by merely repealing Section 40.
'Supra, n. 2 249.
7 Supra, n. 3, 600.

8 1 Esp. 180, S. C. Peake 225 (1794).
9 CRAWFORD,

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

LAW,

3d ed.

55.

10 243 Mass. 174, 137 N. E. 295 (1922).
The court held in this case that two
special indorsements after a blank indorsement might be struck out under Section 48
as not necessary to the holder's title.
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In Article 4, entitled "Rights of the Holder," two changes
are proposed. Section 52 is made to read: "A holder in due
course is a holder, including a payee, who has taken the
instrument," etc. The words "including a payee" are new.
At common law the payee might be a holder in due course.
Under the Negotiable Instruments Law the decisions are
divided." The purpose of this amendment is to give the
same protection to a payee as to an indorsee if the instrument is taken in due course. This happens when possession
of a check is intrusted by the drawer to some one other
than the payee and is delivered to the payee without authority but is taken in good faith and for value. The amendment is desirable, but would seemingly necessitate changes
in other sections to avoid uncertainty. In Section 16, for instance, it is provided that "As between immediate parties
and as regards a remote party other than a holder in due
course, the delivery, in order to be effectual, must be made
either by or under the authority of the party making, drawing, accepting or indorsing as the case may be." This sentence should be made to read: "As against a party other
than a holder in due course, the delivery," etc., since such
a drawer and payee as are referred to above would be immediate parties and without this change would not have the
rights of a holder in due course which Section 52 as amended would secure to the payee. Section 30 also requires
modification for the same reason. The Committee on Amendment of Uniform Acts recommends this change also, but in
place of the words "including a payee," makes the section
read: "A holder in due course is a payee or other holder
who has taken the instrument," etc. The Committee also
recommends the modification of Sections 16 and 30 to make
them conform to the change in Section 52. Here again it
would seem to be preferable to follow the language of the
Committee's proposed amendments.
Section 58 has also been changed in accordance with a
suggestion of Professor Brannan. 12 This section originally
provided that "A holder who derives his title through a
holder in due course, and who is not himself a party to any
fraud or illegality affecting the instrument, has all the rights
n See cases in BRANNAN'S

369.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

LAW ANN., 4th ed. pp.

862-

12Supra, n. 3, 502.
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of such former holder in respect to all parties prior to the
latter." In the case of Horan v. Mason,13 the New York court
held that a holder with notice of the fraud, who thereafter
transferred the instrument to a holder in due course and
later re-acquired it, had the rights of a holder in due
course. The purpose of the amendment, as explained in the
Revisers' Note, 14 is "to make certain that a holder with notice should not be able to cure a defect in his title by transferring the instrument to a holder in due course and then
re-acquiring the instrument." This is done by excluding
from the rights of a holder in due course anyone who has
"previously been a holder with notice and subject to the
defense of such fraud or illegality." No pressing need for
this amendment is apparent. The holder with notice in
Horan v. Mason became "a party to the fraud" when he sold
the instrument to a holder in due course and thus cut off
the defense of fraud. This is the view taken by other
courts. 15 The fact that the Committee on Amendment of
Uniform Acts fails to recommend this amendment argues
against its necessity. However, since it does not change
the law, its adoption would be harmless.
Modification of three sections in Article 5, dealing with
liability of parties, is proposed. Two subsections of Section 64 are re-written so as to enable the drawer of an
eccepted bill, payable to his own order, to hold a person
who indorses for the purpose of guaranteeing payment.
"This omission," states the Revisers' Note,' 6 "was no doubt
an oversight on the part of the author of the original statute." This change has been recommended by Dean Ames 17
but is not included in the Report of the Committee on
Amendment of Uniform Acts. The fact that in the only
cases where the omission has threatened to produce the
wrong result the courts have found a way of reaching the
correct result, may have influenced the Committee. The
amendment as proposed would do no harm except to produce further lack of uniformity.
Section 66, defining the liability of the general indorser
; 141 App. Div. 89, 125 N. Y. S. 668 (1910).

24Supra,

n.

1, 8.

Berenson v. Conant, 214 Mass. 127, 101 N. E. 60 (1913) ; Bank of Ideno v.
Colter, 94 Okla. 213, 221 Pac. 495 (1923); Comstock v. Buckley, 141 Wise. 228, 124
N. W. 414 (1910).

15Supra,

n. 1, 9.
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has been altered by the Revisers in several respects.
now reads:

It

"Liability of General Indorser. Every indorser who indorses without qualification, warrants to all subsequent
holders in due course; (1) the matters and things mentioned in subdivisions one, two, and three of the next preceding sections; and (2) that the instrument is at the time
of his indorsement valid and subsisting. And, in addition, he engages that on due presentment it shall be accepted or paid, or both, as the case may be, according to
its tenor and that if it be dishonored and the necessary
proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the
amount thereof to the holder, or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it."
The first change suggested is the insertion of the words
"except an accommodation indorser" after the word "indorser" in the first line. Since an accommodation indorser
isnot a vendor, he should not be liable as a warrantor. This
change has been made in Illinois, following the suggestion
of Dean Ames.18 It seems to be desirable. The second change
suggested would incorporate the fourth waranty mentioned in Section 65-"That he has no knowledge of any
fact which would impair the validity of the instrument or
render it valueless." This, evidently, is taken from the
Illinois Act also. The Revisers give no reason for this change
and the writer can discover none. The warranty "that the
instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid and sub.
sisting" affords all the protection that the former does, and
more. Such a departure from uniformity, for no apparent
reason, is not desirable. The third change in this Section is
necessary if the first one is made. "He" is changed to
"every indorser" so that the remainder of the Section shall
apply to an accommodation indorser. Otherwise, the accommodation indorser would incur no liability.
Two changes are suggested also in Section 68. The first
has to do with the order of liability of indorsers. The original act reads:
"As respects one another, indorsers are liable prima facie
in the order in which they indorse; but evidence is admissible to show that as between or among themselves
they have, agreed otherwise. Joint payees or joint in17Supra, n. 2. 250.
1'Supra, n. 2, 251-252.
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dorsers who indorse are deemed to indorse jointly or
severally."
The Revisers insert a provision that accommodation or irregular indorsers, indorsing for the same party, are prima
facie equally liable. Here they are acting, apparently, on
their own initiative. Not even has the Illinois Act made this
change, and Dean Ames sees no cause, apparently, for
taking exception to the rule as stated. The Revisers' Note
points out that the existing rule "has resulted, in a number
of cases, in manifest injustice to parties, and, in order to
prevent injustice, the courts have been driven to the necessity of setting up an agreement among such indorsers fixing
their liability equally as among themselves, when in fact
no such agreement existed." 19 True enough, our court has
said that "such an agreement need not be express but may
be inferred from facts, circumstances and conduct,

' 20

but

can one say properly in such a case that "in fact no such
agreement existed"? With the court taking this position, it
is difficult to see-how injustice is likely to occur. The fact
that no other state has made this change and the failure of
the Committee on Amendment of Uniform Laws to recommend it, raise a doubt as to its need.
The second change in Section 68 makes all parties jointly
bound on a negotiable instrument jointly and severally
liable. The present Act makes only joint payees or joint
indorsers jointly and severally liable. This follows the
Illinois Act. It also conforms to the provisions of Article 8,
c. 55 of the Revisers' Report. It is probably desirable aside
from the consideration of uniformity.
Several important changes are made in Article 6 relating
to presentment for payment. From Section 70 the following provision is omitted: "but if the instrument is, by its
terms, payable at a special place, and he is able and willing
to pay it there at maturity, such ability and willingness are
equivalent to a tender of payment upon his part." Wisconsin has omitted this provision and three other states have
added, after the word "maturity," "and has funds there
available for that purpose." The Revisers argue 2' that since
the result of an unaccepted tender of payment is to dis"
21

Supra, n. 1, 9.
Plumley v. Bank of Hinton, 76 W. Va. 635, 87 S. E. 94 (1916).
Supra,
n.

1, 10.
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charge all persons secondarily liable on the instrument, a
layman, ignorant of the law, may be subjected under the
present rule to losses which, "but for the changes in the
law made by the Act of 1907" would not be incurred. The
danger here appears to be imaginary. Secondary parties
are discharged if presentment is not made. The provision
the Revisers would omit merely adds a penalty of loss of
interest and costs in case of suit against the primary party
to collect the note when he was ready and willing to pay at
the specified place. The section as it stands does not appear objectionable and its change would put our law at
variance with that of practically all the other states.
A new provision also has been added to this Section, as
follows: "The Statute of Limitations shall not begin to
run against the holder of a certificate of deposit or a bank
note until after presentment and demand for payment."
The same purpose is accomplished in a different way by
the amendment proposed by the Committee on Amendment
of Uniform Acts. Their suggestion is to make the first
sentence of Section 70 read as follows: "Presentment for
payment is not necessary, except in the case of bank notes
and certificates of deposit, in order to charge the person
primarily liable on the instrument." The effect of this section, as originally drawn, on certificates of deposit and
bank notes was evidently overlooked. The change is clearly
advisable. It would seem preferable to adopt the latter
form and thus avoid further departure from uniformity. It
would seem, also, that the same business custom with reference to which this change is made, would require a qualification of Section 53, such as proposed in the Amendatory
Act, making that Section read: "Where an instrument
payable on demand, other than a bank note or a certificate
of deposit, is negotiated an unreasonable length of time
after its issue, the holder is not deemed a holder in due
course."
To Section 72 the Revisers would add a sentence designating to whom presentment shall be made on behalf of a
corporation. This would seem to be unnecessary, as no difficulty, apparently, has arisen under the present Act.
In Section 73, dealing with place of presentment for payment, the Revisers have proposed a change which is ex-
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ceedingly objectionable.

The section now provides:

"Presentment for payment is made at the proper place
1. Where a place of payment is specified in the instrument and it is there presented;
2. Where no place of payment is specified, but the address of the person to make payment is given in the
instrument and it is there presented;
3. Where no place of payment is specified and no address is given and the instrument is presented at
the usual place of business or residence of the person to make payment;
4. In any other case if presented to the person to make
payment wherever he can be found, or if presented
at his last known place of business or residence."
The Revisers would leave (1) as it is and for (2), (3), and
(4) substitute the following: "Where no place of payment
is specified, when presented at the usual place of business
or residence of the holder. A person having an instrument
in his possession for collection. is a holder within the purview of this section."
Presentment for payment is one of the steps necessary to
fix the liability of drawers and indorsers, but is not necessary in order to charge persons primarily liable on the instrument. It has always, by common understanding, meant
an exhibition of the instrument by the holder to the maker
or acceptor, accompanied by a demand for payment, in
accordance with the rules laid down in Sections 72 and 73,
which merely codify the common law. The drawer and indorsers could demand due diligence from the holder, and
due diligence included hunting up the party primarily liable
and seeking payment from him before looking to the parties secondarily liable for payment. By the change suggested, the holder would be relieved entirely of this obligation.
If no place of payment is specified, the holder, by having
the instrument in his possession at his usual place of business or residence at maturity, is entitled not only to hold the
primary party, but upon giving notice of nonpayment to
parties secondarily liable, to hold them as well. 22 To prevent
this result the maker or acceptor must locate the paper in
22 Section 6 of Article 6 of the Revisers' Report, corresponding to Section 15. c. 98-a
of the present Code, provides: "When no place of payment is specified in the instrument, the presence of the same for delivery to the person entitled to it upon payment,
on the day for presentment, at the usual place of business or residence of the holder,
if the person entitled to presentment be not there found, shall be deemed a sufficient
presentment."
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the hands of the holder and make payment there. If he
fails to do so, the paper is dishonored. If able and willing
to pay, but unable to locate the holder of the instrument,
presumably the same result would follow. This certainly
effects a radical change in the conditions under which a
drawer and indorser agree to pay. While purporting to
affect only the place of presentment, it in fact abolishes the
requirement of presentment in case of all instruments
which do not specify a place of payment. If this is the purpose of the Revisers, they should abolish it expressly, and
not, under pretense of retaining the requirement, completely nullify it.
The reasons assigned for this change in the long Revisers'
Note 23 accompanying this section would lend support to
much that is written and believed regarding our State.
They tell us that the "Act of 1907 is reasonably suitable in
centers of population but is wholly unsuited to the wide,
unsettled spaces and points of difficult access in West Virginia," and that Section 73 is "'unsuited to the conditions
under which business is transacted in West Virginia." They
argue further that "the present law places upon the layman
holding a negotiable instrument * * * * the difficult and

onerous task of locating the person to make payment and
transmitting the instrument to the place of business or residence of such person." The change they propose "makes
presentment for payment simple and inexpensive and any
objections to this provision are outweighed by its advantages."
Just how conditions under which business is transacted in
West Virginia differ from those in many other States is not
explained, nor can we properly claim a monopoly on "wide,
unsettled spaces and points of difficult access." Surely a
requirement which has been a part of the common law for
a century or more, is the law in all of our States and has
been a part of our own law for twenty years, 24 must not
have proved to be unduly onerous or burdensome. The fact
that the holders of commercial paper seldom acquire it
without ascertaining the residence and financial responsibility of its signers; that the requirement can be waived if
23 Supra, n. 1, 10-11.

2 Prior to the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law in West Virginia, only
instruments payable at a bank were negotiable.
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the parties see fit; and that by Section 82 presentment is
dispensed with where, after the exercise of reasonable
diligence it can not be made, all go to show that the difficulty of finding the primary party is largely imaginary. The
modification proposed is a radical departure from long established custom, would put our law at variance with that
of all other states, and would lead to numerous complications in case of bills drawn and indorsed in other States and
payable here, and those drawn here and payable elsewhere. The writer is unable to see the advantages in the
change which outweigh these objections.
If the suggested amendment to Section 73 should be
adopted, it would necessitate the modification of Sections
75, 76, 77 and 78 as proposed by the Revisers. As the
changes are for the purpose of making these sections conform to Section 73, the objections urged to its adoption
apply equally to them.
From Section 80 the Revisers would omit everything after
the word "accommodation." The section now reads: "Presentment for payment is not required in order to charge an
indorser where the instrument was made or accepted for
his accommodation and he has no reason to expect that the
instrument will be paid if presented." This change follows
the precedent of Illinois. The amendment is unobjectionable in itself. It is doubtful, however, whether it is of
sufficient importance to justify a departure from uniformity.
A complete change in the law as laid down in Section
87 would be accomplished by the amendment proposed to
that section. It now reads: "Where the instrument is made
payable at a bank it is equivalent to an order to the bank
to pay the same for the account of the principal debtor
thereon." By inserting the word "not" before "equivalent,"
the meaning of the section is reversed. No reason for this
change is advanced in the Revisers' Note beyond the following statement :25 "Without directions, either general or
specific from the depositor so to do, a bank should not apply
his funds to the payment of a note because payable at such
bank." The opinion thus expressed may be sound, but
opinion alone seems scarcely sufficient to justify an impor25

Supra, n. 1, 12.
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tant change in the statutory law of a state. It is true, as
the Note states, that four States have omitted this section
entirely and two others have changed it as the Revisers suggest. While this lends support to their opinion, the fact
that, in spite of this diversity of view, no such change is
suggested by the Amendatory Act indicates- that no general
dissatisfaction it in evidence. It would seem much the wiser
policy to stay with the majority of the States unless general adoption of this amendment can be secured through the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.
The only change suggested in Article 7 is the insertion
in Section 113 of the words "or other person entitled to
give notice," which would make the section read: "Delay
in giving notice of dishonor is excused when the delay is
caused by circumstances beyond the control of the holder,
or the person entitled to give notice, and not imputable to
his default, misconduct or negligence." This probably improvqs the section, but since no harm, likely, would result
from leaving it as it stands, it seems better to do so for the
sake of uniformity.
Sections 119 and 120 have proved to be among the most
troublesome in the Negotiable Instruments Law, and there
is general agreement that they should be re-written. The
Revisers have adopted the form proposed by Professor
Brannan 21 for amending Section 119. It is as follows:
"How Instrument Discharged. A negotiable instrument is discharged:
(a) By payment in due course by or on behalf of the
person primarily liable;
(b) By payment in due course by the party accommodated, where the instrument is made or accepted for accommodation;
(c) By the intentional cancellation thereof by the
holder;
(d) When the person primarily liable becomes the
holder of the instrument at or after maturity in his own
right."
The principal change is the omission of subsection (4) of
the present section, which reads: "By any other act which
will discharge a Gimple contract for the payment of mon^0Supra, n. 8, 593-596.
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ey." This is an obvious error. Payment or accord and satisfaction before mafurity certainly cannot discharge a negotiable note. The words "persons primarily liable" in
subsections 1 and 5 are used in lieu of "principal debtor"
in order to eliminate questions of suretyship. These proposed changes are desirable. The Amendatory Act makes
the same changes with the substitution of the words "rightful owner" for "holder" in subsection 3. The wisdom of
this departure from the language of Professor Brannan
has been questioned and the term "holder" may be restored
before final acceptance of the report.
Section 120 has also been re-written by the Revisers in
accordance with the suggestion of Professor Brannan, as
follows :27

"When a Party Discharged." A party to a negotiable
instrument is discharged:
(a) By any act which discharges the instrument.
(b) By the intentional cancellation of his signature by
the holder;
(c) By a valid tender of payment made by a prior
party;
(d) This section does not include the rules governing the discharge of a surety or party secondarily liable
because of such secondary liability."
The proposed amendment enlarges the scope of the section, making it apply to "a party to a negotiable instrument" instead of a party secondarily liable. Three subsections of the present act are omitted. They provide for
the discharge of indorsers upon specific doctrines of the
law of suretyship, and the courts have been unable to agree
as to whether the section was exclusive and superseded all
former recognized doctrines of suretyship. The proposed
section makes this clear and is a decided improvement.
Subsection (d) is not included in Professor Brannan's form
and perhaps is unnecessary, as all the troublesome clauses
are omitted, but it does no harm. The amendment to this
section proposed in the Amendatory Act differs in several
respects. Subsection (3) reads: "By a valid tender of payment in due course made either by a prior party or by a
subsequent party for whose accommodation the party
signed the instrument"; and there is added to the section:
= Ibid.
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"As between immediate parties any defense is effectual
which would be a defense to a simple contract for the payment of money." The purpose of the amendment is the
same, however, and one would likely serve as well as the
other.
The modification of Section 124 is apparently to restore
the common law as it existed prior to the Negotiable Instruments Law. Taken literally, the existing statute avoids
the instrument though the alteration was made without
fraudulent intent and though it was made by third persons.
The Revisers insert after the word "altered" the following
words: "By the holder or by some one acting with the authority or consent of the holder." This change would restore the American doctrine of spoliation which, it is generally agreed, Section 124 abrogates. It does not, however,
restore the law as to innocent alterations. The form recommended in the Amendatory Act accomplishes both purposes by providing: "Where a negotiable instrument is
fraudulently and materially altered by the rightful owner
Nvithout the assent of all parties liable thereon, it is avoided,
etc." A holder who has innocently altered an instrument
should have the right to restore it to its original condition
and to recover thereon. The amendment proposed by Professor Williston's Committee therefore seems preferable.
Two changes are proposed in Article 10 dealing with
"Acceptance." By Section 134, when an acceptance is written
on a paper other than the bill itself, it does not bind the acceptor except in favor of a person to whom it is shown and
who, on the faith thereof, receives the bill for value. In
the following section, dealing with an unconditional promise in writing to accept a bill, sight of the paper is not required. No good reason is apparent why sight should be
required in the one case and not in the other. The Revisers
propose to omit the words "to whom it is shown and" from
Section 134. The Illinois and South Dakota Acts do the
same. It has not been thought of enough importance to be
included in the Amendatory Act.
Section 137 is also changed in several respects in accordance with the suggestion of Professor Brannan. 28 "Within
twenty-four hours" is changed to "after the expiration of
23 Ibid.
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twenty-four hours," and "within luch other period" 5s
changed to "or such longer period," to make the section
consistent with Section 136. The important alteration is
that in place of providing that a drawee who destroys a
bill or refuses to return it should be deemed to have accepted it, it is provided that the holder will be deemed to have
converted the same and shall be liable in damages for the
amount of the bill. These changes are advisable. Professor Brannan has made it clear 29 that uniformity cannot
be hoped for under the present section. Several States 'have
refused to adopt it. The Committee in drafting the Amendatory Act has likewise adopted Professor Brannan's substitute.
Section 186, due to an inadvertance, apparently, changed
the settled law regarding the discharge of a drawer of a
check to whom notice or dishonor is not given. Section 186,
as it stands, deals only with presentment. So far as notice
of dishonor is concerned, it seems to be governed by the
general provision in Section 89, which provides that drawers and indorsers are discharged by failure to give them
notice of dishonor. In short, failure to present merely discharges the drawer to the extent of his loss, while failure
to give notice of dishonor when presentment is made discharges him altogether. This is not a desirable result. While
Illinois is the only State which has changed the section thus
far, the Amendment is approved by Professor Brannan 0
and is included in the Amendatory Act. The Revisers have
added to Section 186 the following sentence: "Failure of
the holder to give the drawer due notice of dishonor will
discharge him from liability thereon only to the extent of
the loss caused by the delay." The form suggested in the
Amendatory Act is perhaps better. It is as follows: "A
check must be presented in payment within a reasonable
time after its issue, and notice of dishonor must be given
to the drawer, as provided for in the case of bills of exchange, or the drawer will be discharged to the extent of
the loss caused by the delay." This does not conflict in
any way with Section 89 because of the opening words of
the latter: "Except as herein otherwise provided." The
" BRANNAN'S NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
3D Supra, n. 3, 599.

LAW ANN., 4th ed. pp. 842-843.
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special provisions governing checks are placed together under Title III, Article 1.
The last change suggested is the insertion of the words
"law and equity including" in Section 196, io that it will
read: "In any case not provided for in this chapter, the
rules of law and equity including the law merchant shall
govern." As the law merchant is not today a separate
branch of the law, the form suggested is preferable. Several States have made this change. It is of no great consequence, but can do no harm.
If this analysit of the proposed changes in our Negotiable Instruments Law is at all accurate, it should be reasonably clear that certain of the changes suggested are inherently objectionable; that others are perhaps good
enough in themselves but not at all necessary; and that the
badly needed and desirable ones, with possibly one or two
exceptions, will in all likelihood be recommended to the
States for general adoption by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. It would seem,
then, that action on this chapter might well be deferred until the recommendations of that body are put into final form
and submitted to the States. If it then appears that further
alteration is necessary to make the Act consistent with other
sections of the Code, such change could be made at that
time. It is not at all likely that the legislature will refuse
to adopt the uniform amendments when proposed. Aside
from the natural desire to keep in line with the other States,
the merit of the amendments will commend them. A brief
reference to those embodied in the Committee's report 3' to
which reference has not already been made, will indicate
their scope and purpose.
The first Amendment is to the title of the Law, which
would become: "A General Act Relating to Negotiable Instruments for the Payment of Money"; and the first section
would read: "An instrument for the payment of money to
be negotiable, etc." The purpose is "to narrow the operation of the Negotiable Instruments Law to promises to pay
money, leaving other promises to the operation of the com-

2 For a careful analysis and criticism of this report see Britton, "The Proposed

Amendments to the Negotiable Instruments Law," 22 ILL. L. REv. 815.
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mon law as it may be qualified by custom and by statute. 3 , 2
It is pointed out 33 that as the law now stands, it denies negotiability to interim receipts and other receipts for securities, and would seem to prevent negotiability of bills of
lading and warehouse receipts if enacted subsequently to
the Acts governing those instruments.
Section 5 would be amended so as to read: "An instrument is not negotiable which contains an order or promise
to do any act in addition to the payment of money, unless
Such additional act is apparently intended to render more
secure and certain the payment of the sum of money to
which the order or promise relates." The object of this is
to "preserve the negotiability of elaborate forms of notes
and -corporate bonds which frequently contain additional
promises."3 4
An amendment to Subsection 5 of Section 6 is "to settle
a conflict in the cases as to the meaning of "current money,"
some cases holding that it can mean only legal tender. Section 23 would be made to read: "When the signature of a
:person is forged or made without authority, it is inoperative to render him liable or to transfer his rights under the
instrument unless he is precluded from setting up the
forgery or want of authority." This change avoids the too
broad effect of the words "wholly inoperative" in the present act. Professor Williston points out 3 that a forgery is
not necessarily wholly inoperative. It may render a person who commits the forgery liable as an indorser or effect a
transfer of the instrument in case of impersonation."
To Section 29 would be added the following: "But negotiation after maturity by the accommodated party without
the assent of the accommodation party is a breach of faith."
This would settle a conflict in the cases which will likely
continue unless some such amendment is adopted.
Section 37, relating to the effect of a restrictive indorsement, has not been satisfactory. The Committee points
out 36 that "under clause 2 of Section 37 of the Act, as it
stands, which confers upon the indorsee the right ....
to
2 See Report of the Committee on Amendments
of Uniform Acts to the ThirtySeventh Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, p. 10.

"Ibid, 9.
- Ibid, 10.
Ibid, 10.
- Ibid, 11.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1928

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [1928], Art. 3
AMENDING OUR NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS L W 345

bring any action thereon that the indorser could bring,"
an indorser even though for value could not be sued by an
indorsee in trust for a third person. The Amended section
would read:
"A restrictive indorsement confers upon the indorsee
the right:
(1) To receive payment of the instrument;
(2) To bring any action thereon that the indorser could
bring; or except in the case of a restrictive endorsement specified in subsection 2 of Section 36, any action against the indorser or any prior party that an
unrestrictive indorsee would be entitled to bring.
(3) To transfer the instrument where the form of the
indorsement authorized him so to do.
But all subsequent indorsees acquire only the title of the
first indorsee under the restrictive indorsement, specified
in Subsection 1 of Section 36 and as against the principal
or cestui que trust only the title of the first indorsee under
the restrictive indorsement specified respectively in Subsections 2 and 3 of Section 35."
An amendment to Section 47 would prevent the result
that a restrictive indorsement of any other character than
that in Subsection 1 of Section 36 makes an instrument
non-negotiable.
Section 71 inadvertently changed the law. By its terms,
presentment for payment in case of a bill of exchange will
be sufficient if made within a reasonable time after the last
negotiation of the bill. This permits negotiation for an indefinite period without discharging secondary parties. The
amendment proposed is as follows:
"Where the instrument is not payable on demand, presentment must be made on the day it falls due. Where it
is payable on demand, presentment must be made within
a reasonable time after the indorsement in order to charge
the indorser, and in case of a bill of exchange presentment for payment must be made within a reasonable time
after its issue in order to charge the drawer."
Section 85, which the Reviserp have "retained in the
original form, with the hope that at some future time an
effort will be made to reconcile the various changes which
have been made by the different states,"3 7 is restated as follows in the Amendatory Act:
" Supra, n. 1, 12.
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"Every negotiable instrument is payable at the time
fixed therein without grace, except that when the day of
maturity falls upon Saturday, Sunday, or a holiday, the
instrument is payable on the next succeeding business day
which is not a Saturday. Instruments payable on demand may at the option of the holder be presented for
payment before twelve o'clock noon on Saturday when
that entire day is not a holiday."
"Whether this will prove acceptable as a substitute for the
various provisions enacted by the different states remains to
be seen.
The last amendment proposed would, under Section 60,
give the same opportunity for protesting a lost or destroyed
note which now is allowed in the case of a bill.
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